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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the research presented here was to in-
vestigate the effects of communication upon reactions to
"unconditionally cooperative" behavior in an experimental
mixed-motive conflict situation. Mixed-motive conflict
refers to a situation involving at least two persons where
each person is motivated both to cooperate and to compete
with the other(s). If one person always cooperates, his
behavior is defined as "unconditionally cooperative".
Previous research has not fully related communication
variables to unconditional cooperation. The failure to
Con ^iHor rnmrm mication wari 1 *a«s m^w Vml ^ e»v r>1 »
i
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conditional cooperation is typically not reciprocated in
laboratory bargaining research (cf. Nemeth, 1970; Dorris,
1972).
The studies reviewed here have used a Prisoner's Dilemma
Game ( PDG ) , or a conceptually similar task, to create a con-
flict based upon the subject's motivation to maximize his
monetary earnings and his dependence upon the other sub-
ject's choices in achieving this goal. The task is de-
signed such that each person has two possible choices
(A and B ) • The following payoffs are associated with their
joint dec i sions
:
1) If both choose A, then they split the maximum joint
payof f
•
2) If both choose 3, then they split the minimum joint
payoff
.
3) If A and B are chosen, the person choosing A gets
the smallest possible payoff, while the person
choosing B gets the largest possible payoff.
Choosing "A" is described as a "cooperative" choice because
it is essential to achieving the highest joint payoff; choos
ing "3" can reflect several intentions, depending upon what
choice is expected from the other person. If the other per-
son is expected to consistently choose A regardless of the
subject's choices, the other person's behavior is described
as "unconditionally cooperative". If under these conditions
the subject chooses B, this choice is described as "exploit-
ative"
.
Existing laboratory research on "unconditional coopera-
tion" has generally not allowed any communication between
the subjects and found that there is little reciprocity of
unconditional cooperation (e.g., Bixenstine, Potash &
Wilson, 1963; Lave, 1965; Shure & Meeker, 1967; Solomon,
1960; Swingle ft Gillis, 1968; Whitworth & Lucker, 1969).
Only two studies have dealt with the role of communication
affecting reaction to "unconditional cooperation". One
study which allowed communication found a reduction in ex-
ploitation of the "unconditional cooperator" after he com-
municated the reasons for his unconditional cooperation
(Shure, Meeker & Hansford, 1965). Dorris (1972) also found
that unconditional cooperation was reciprocated when it was
3accompanied by a communication which emphasized the moral
norms relevant to the subject's behavior and appealed for
help on the basis of legitimate need. Although subjects
responded more cooperatively following a moral appeal than
a neutral one, it is unclear exactly which aspects of the
moral appeal were responsible for the increase in reciprocal
cooperation
.
Research on the effect of communication in bargaining
studies not involving "unconditional cooperation" has con-
sistently shown that cooperation increases when subjects are
allowed to communicate. However, communication has not been
well conceptualized in these studies. Early studies (e.g.,
Deutsch, 1958) which used only written communications con-
sistently found that the more information (about the inten-
tions and expectations of the communicator) that the message
contained, the greater the cooperation on the part of the
subject. More recently Wichman (1970) varied the availability
of nonverbal cues and found that there was more cooperation
when subjects were allowed to see each other than when they
were not. However, in V/ichman's study the anonymity of the
subject was confounded with nonverbal communication. Sub-
jects in the visual condition may have cooperated due to
concerns about their "public image" while subjects who could
not see each other may have felt less pressure to be coopera-
tive (cf. Marlowe, Gergen Doob, 1966).
Aside from Wichman's study and some earlier unpublished
research by Dorris (1968) the distinction between verbal and
nonverbal, communication has not been considered in relation
to mixed-motive conflict resolution. The importance of this
distinction is suggested by research done in other contexts.
Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1967, p, 66) distinguished
two types of communication, "digital" and "analogic". Digital
communication refers to the verbal content of a message which
may be either written or spoken. Analogic communication in-
cludes virtually all nonverbal communication. Watzlawick
et aj_ argue that "whenever the relationship between people
is the central issue of communication, digital language is
almost meaningless" (p. 63). Similarly, Mehrabian and
Ferris' (1967) research on the importance of various com-
munication "channels" in expressing affect found that over
90% of affect v/as communicated by two nonverbal channels,
facial expression and voice tone. Mehrabian and Reed (1968)
also present evidence that communication accuracy is directly
related to the availability of normally used channels of
communication. Taken together, these studies suggest the
need to consider nonverbal communication channels as well
as content channels in the context of bargaining, and es-
pecially in relation to communicating the intentions behind
"unconditional cooperation".
Communication between the two persons in the conflict
situation fulfills several functions. It makes explicit
the intentions of the communicator. Furthermore, since
both the situation and the relationship between the two
5persons are ambiguous, communication helps to clarify the
appropriate behavioral norms and define the relationship.
Nemeth (1970) argues that, without communication, sub-
jects do not interpret "unconditional cooperation" by their
partner as stemming from cooperative intent; instead they
see this behavior as being indicative of confusion or even
deceptive strategy. She reviews several studies of helping
behavior which indicate that "reciprocity of benefits occurs
only when the original benefit is seen as intentional and
altruistically based" (p. 304). Thus, "one would expect
reciprocity of cooperation in bargaining games .. .when the
partner is seen as intentionally benefiting the subject"
(p. 304).
Another effect that communication may have on the sub-
ject is to clarify the relationship between the "uncondi-
tional cooperator" and the subject. In most bargaining
studies this relationship is unspecified since the two par-
ticipants are "randomly assigned" to conditions and have no
prior or anticipated future relationship. Several bargain-
ing studies have shown that cooperation is greater between
subjects having a friendly relationship than none at all or
a hostile one (e.g., McClintock & McNeel , 1967; Swingle &
Gillis, 1963). Anticipating future contact also influences
reactions to "unconditional cooperation" (Marlowe, Gergen &
Doob, 1966).
Communication may also serve to clarify behavioral norms
in an ambiguous situation. Alexander and Weil (1969) re-
view a number of PDG experiments and conclude that the
"official rules of the game are highly ambiguous and that
the circumstances of play are likely to prompt subjects to
look for 'experimental' norms as guides to action" (p. 122
To the extent that the experimental instructions do not se
normative expectations for the player's behavior, communi-
cations from the "unconditional cooperator" may be very ir
fluential in determining what sort of behavior is appro-
priate in the situation. Dorris (1972) found evidence ths
subjects who interpreted an "unconditionally cooperative"
coin seller as making "moral norms" salient in evaluating
the coin buyer's behavior are more cooperative in return.
In many studies experimental instructions make "individual
istic sets" (i.e., subjects are instructed to try and earr
as many points for themselves as they can) highly salient
and "self-concern" is emphasized to the extent of making
"norm of reciprocity" (which the "unconditional cooperate
is trying to evoke) less salient. Hence, "unconditional
cooperation" may appear to be a deceptive strategy or an
inappropriate attempt to evoke guilt (cf. Nemeth, 1970,
p. 302; Shure, Meeker & Hansford, 1965, p. 114).
The present experiment was designed to study reac-
tions to an "unconditional cooperator" as a function of
the communications associated with the behavior. The stu
was designed to investigate the effects of variations
in both the content of the message and the manner in which
it is communicated on the recipient's behavior in a PDG.
The subjects were confronted with a series of "uncon-
ditionally cooperative" choices from the other person (con-
federate) in a PDG. The confederate always responded coopera-
tively (response A, Figure 1) regardless of what the subject
did. The payoff matrix was designed so as to favor ex-
ploitation of the "unconditionally cooperative" choices, es-
pecially given that the subject's motivation for partici-
pating in the experiment (which was to earn money) also
favored exploitation. However, the subject still had to
decide what behaviors were appropriate for achieving her
monetary goals in relation to the other person. That is,
official rules regarding appropriate behavior were ambiguous
and subjects had to develop their own set of rules (Alex-
ander & Well, 1969). In this regard both the verbal and
nonverbal content of the "unconditional cooperator ' s" mes-
sages were expected to influence the subject's perception
of what behaviors were appropriate in achieving her goal of
earning money. The interpretation the subject made of the
confederate's "unconditional behavior" and any communication
which accompanied it was expected to influence her behavioral
choices
.
Insert Figure 1 about here
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Payoff matrix used in "decision-making" task
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There were four experimental conditions and a control
condition. The control condition was designed to approxi-
mate the no communication conditions used in earlier re-
search on "unconditional cooperation". In it there was no
communication of any kind between the subject and the con-
federate. Thus, the subject's behavior was assumed to be
largely determined by her incentive to earn money, and by
her interpretation of the "unconditional cooperator ' s" be-
havior which was expected to emphasize confusion, stupidity
or lack of concern (cf. Solomon, 1960). Level of coopera-
tive responding by the subject was expected to be lowest in
the control condition (e.g., Bixenstine, Potash & Wilson,
1963).
The four experimental conditions were arranged in a
2X2 factorial design involving two different message con-
tents (content) crossed with two methods of communication
(mode). The content of communication was either a coopera-
tive appeal (appeal condition) or a neutral statement (neu-
tral condition) (see Method section) and the mode of com-
municating was either written or spoken. The modes of com-
munication differed only that the spoken communication con-
tained several sets of nonverbal cues (tone of voice, facia
expressions) which were lacking in the written communica-
tion. An attempt was made to hold anonymity of subjects
constant across all five conditions.
10
The effect of the content of the communication was hyoo-
thesized to be as follows: More reciprocal cooperation was
expected to occur following a cooperative appeal than either
a neutral statement or no communication regardless of whe-
ther or not nonverbal cues were available. This prediction
was based on Deutsch's (1958) findings and those of the two
studies of unconditional cooperation by Shure et al (1965)
and Dorris (1972). it was expected that after receiving a
cooperative appeal the subject would perceive the situa-
tion as one in which reciprocity norms were relevant and
would perceive the other subject as having benevolent in-
tentions behind her actions (cf. Nemeth. 1970). Whether or
not there would be a difference between the neutral and no
communication (control) condition would depend upon what
effect the neutral statement had on the subject. If the
contact and relationship implicit in such a statement
increased the familiarity or sense of common fate between
the subject and the "unconditional cooperator", more coopera-
tion was expected in neutral than no communication condition
(e.g., Swingle £ Gil lis, 1963). If the neutral statement
made the subject feel inappropriately pressured or guilty
then the same amount or less cooperation than in the no
communication conditions was expected (cf. Shure et al ,
1965).
Mode of communicating was expected to have effects due
to the differential accessibility of nonverbal cues.
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Differences between the written and spoken message were ex-
pected since nonverbal cues were available only in the
spoken message. Having these cues available was expected
to 1) increase the number of information channels avail-
able to the subject in her attempts to understand the "un-
conditional cooperator' s" message by making facial expres-
sions, gestures and tone of voice available for interpre-
tation of meaning of the message (Mehrabian & Reed, 1968);
2) communicate whatever affect the "unconditional coopera-
tor" felt toward the subject (Mehrabian & Ferris, 1967); and
3) communicate information about how the "unconditional co-
operator" was defining the relationship between herself and
The confederates who gave the spoken messages were
trained so that the content of their message was consistent
wi th thei r nonverbal communication. Research reported el se-
where (Dorris, Kahn & Shippee, 1974) found that it was pos-
sible to train confederates to consistently communicate their
intentions to be ei ther honest or deceptive by subtle varia-
tions in their voice and facial expressions while delivering
a message which was virtually identical in content to the
cooperative appeal being used in this study. In the present
study subjects were trained to communicate their intentions
to be honest. Thus, in the spoken-appeal condition the sub-
ject received redundant messages through different channels
which should increase understanding of the message (Mehrabian
& Reed, 1968). It was predicted that subjects would respond
more cooperatively in the spoken appeal condition than in
the written appeal condition. In the spoken neutral condi-
tion the subject's behavior would largely depend on the ef-
fect that the nonverbal communication in addition to the
content of the communication had on her. it was predicted
that if the nonverbal cues increase liking, friendliness or
concern for the other person (as measured by the post-
questionnaire), there would be more cooperation in the
spoken neutral than in the written neutral condition. How-
ever, if the nonverbal communication did not have such an
effect, there would be no difference between the spoken
neutral and written neutral conditions.
METHOD
Sub j ec ts
Sixty-four subjects were used in this study. Potential
subjects were randomly selected from the female, freshmen,
nonpsychol ogy majors in the University of Massachusetts
student telephone directory. Almost all persons contacted
agreed to participate, except when prevented from doing so
by scheduling difficulties. The data from four subjects
had to be discarded for the following reasons: Misunder-
standing instructions (3); evidencing suspicions about the
study (1). Only female subjects were used since females
have been found to be more competitive than males in the
PDG (e.g., Guyer, 1963). Also, it was expected that nor-
13
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psychology majors would be less aware of norms operating in
an experimental situation than psychology majors. All sub-
jects were telephoned and asked to participate in an ex-
periment on "decision-making" and were told that they would
be paid a dollar at the beginning of the experiment and up
to $2.80 total depending upon their "decisions". It was
hoped that the opportunity to earn money would induce sub-
jects to be more competitive during the experiment.
Procedure and Instructions
In order to test our hypotheses regarding relations
between communication and level of cooperative behavior it
was necessary to create an experimental situation in which
1) the unconditionally cooperative behavior of the confe-
derate would be reciprocated minimally without communication,
and 2) the communication could have an effect on the sub-
ject's level of reciprocity of cooperative behavior. Since
it was found in pretesting using male psychology majors that
the base rate of cooperation was close to 100%, various pro-
cedures were adopted in the experiment to induce greater
competition from the subjects.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, each subject was taken
to the experimental room by the experimenter and seated at
2
a table facing the confederate" who was presented as the
first subject, to arrive. The experimenter asked the sub-
ject and the confederate for their names and majors, and
recorded this information. This was done to minimize
14
feelings of anonymity on the subject's part. Both the sub-
ject and confederate had a console in front of them (see
Figure 1). This automated apparatus was used to signal the
beginning of each trial and to give immediate feedback to
the subjects. The subject and confederate each had a typed
copy of the first part of the instructions which included
the structure and rules of the "decision-making" task (ac-
tually the PDG) to follow while the experimenter read them
aloud
.
In order to avoid making game norms salient in the ex-
periment, it was introduced as a "decision-making" task and
no reference was made to the word "game" by the experimenter
or in the questionnaires. Subjects were given an individual-
istic orientation since Deutsch (1958) has found that com-
munication had an effect only when instructions created an
individualistic set. This was done by telling subjects
that "the purpose is to earn as much money for yourself as
you can". (For complete instructions, see Appendix A).
After being instructed, the subject and confederate en-
gaged in four practice trials with predetermined choices
that demonstrated the four possible outcomes contingent oh
their choices. The subject and confederate next completed
a questionnaire testing their comprehension which was imme-
diately scored by the experimenter. On the few occasions
that errors occurred, the experimenter reviewed the relevant
parts of the instructions.
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In order to increase competition, following the four
practice trials, the subject and confederate were each given
one dollar and told that they would keep this money plus
whatever amount they earned during the experiment. Since
it was important that subjects attend to the confederate's
communication, it was necessary to create some uncertainty
as to how, in fact, the confederate v/ould behave v/hen she
claimed that she would be unconditionally cooperative. This
was done by telling subjects that they would receive feed-
back of the results only on some of the trials.
The subject was then asked to indicate on a prequestion-
naire how she perceived s typical other would behave in the
si tua t ion she was about to engage in. The responses were
measured on fourteen bipolar adjective. Each bipolar ad-
jective was based on a 1-7 point scale.
Sub j ec ts were then told that three di f f eren t communi-
cation si tua t ions were being studied and these situations
were described as f ol 1 ows
:
( a ) The two persons won] d not be al lowed to communi-
cate wi th each other abou t anything.
(b) The two persons would be allowed to communicate
wi th each other about anything except about the
experiment
.
(c) The two persons would be allowed to communicate
about anything including the experiment
.
They were further told that the experimenter would decide
randomly which situation they were in by picking a card out
of a bag. At this point subjects were told the following:
I should remind you that people use these oppor-
tunities to communicate for various purposes.
You ought to keep in mind that the message which
you get may say one thing about what the other
person is planning to do, and the person may,
in fact, be planning to do something else. Of
course, people have also sent messages which were
accurate descriptions of what they were planning
to do. You simply have to decide for yourself
what the other person is communicating.
The reason for these instructions was again to increase
subjects' attention to the message if they received one.
By randomly picking a card out of an envelope, the experi-
menter determined which condition the two persons were in
and explained it to them. In the spoken conditions the ex
perimenter first asked the confederate if she would like
to say anything. At this point, the confederate presented
her communication to the subject (see below). The subject
was then given an opportunity to speak. The confederate
was unaware of the experimental condition prior to this
point. Following this, the actual 20 trials of the PDG be
gan
.
A signal light lit up indicating to the subject the be
ginning of each trial. The subject's task was to press a
switch either to the left (labeled A) or to the right
(labeled B) in order to indicate her choice for each trial
A payoff matrix showing the consequences of making the
choice was printed above the switch. After each choice a
light came on in the appropriate quadrant of the matrix,
indicating to the subject what choices she and the con-
federate had made. Subjects did not receive feedback on
17
trials 1, 3, 8, 11, 13, 17, 18, and 20, and a light did not
light up following their decisions on the above trials. in
order to maintain the subject's awareness of her earnings
and concern about losing money, on each trial the subject
recorded her earnings as well as a cumulative total. On
trials in which she did not receive feedback she guessed
how much she earned on that particular trial. After com-
pleting the 20 trials, the subject and confederate were asked
to complete the post-questionnaire.
Upon completion of the experiment the subject was thor-
oughly debriefed and paid according to the amount she
earned during the experiment.
Experimental Condi t ions
Content of communicat ion . In the appeal conditions
subjects were told that they could communicate about any-
thing including the experiment
. The experimenter then in-
dicated that each person could make one statement and asked
the confederate to go first. The confederate made the fol-
lowing appeal :
Look ... the best thing for us to do is to cooperate.
The way this is set up, we both have to choose A
every time to do wel 1 . You know that i f we try to
outguess each other to get more money by tryi ng to
get nine cents, we'll orobably wind up with one
cent each. So I'm going to rely on your coopera-
tion and I'm going to choose A every time. I'd
like you to do the same. I think that's the
faires t way for both of us
In the neutral conditions, subjects were told that they
could communicate about anything except the experiment.
The experimenter then indicated that each person could make
one statement and asked the confederate to go first. The
confederate made the following statement:
Since you want me to talk (glancing to the experi-
menter)...! really don't know what to talk about
since we can't talk about the experiment
.. .but
since we can't talk about the experiment (turning
to the subject ).. .what do you think of this stupid
building? The way it's set up you really have to
know where you're going. It was a real hassle try-
ing to find this room, and when I took the elevator
it took me down before going up. (turning to the
experimenter again) Wei 1 . .
.
geez . . . that ' s about
all I have to say.
Mode of communication
. In the spoken conditions sub-
jects were told that they could communicate verbally and the
confederate made her comments while looking at the subject.
The confederates were trained similarly to confederates in
Dorris, Kahn, and Shippee's (1974) study so that when the
appeal was spoken the attitude conveyed by their nonverbal
gestures was consistent with the content of the appeal,
indicating intentions to be honest. Following the communi-
cations, a curtain was drawn between the subject and con-
federate for the remainder of the experiment. This was
done in order to eliminate any further communication and
to keep the rest of the experiment identical for all con-
ditions.
In the written condition subjects were told that they
could only communicate through written notes and the cur-
tain was drawn between, the subject and confederate prior
to their writing of the notes.
In the control condition subjects were told that they
could not communicate among themselves in any way and the
curtain was drawn for the remainder of the experiment.
Thus, all five conditions were identical following the com-
munication.
Postcuestionn a ire
The postquestionnaire contained various items measur-
ing the subject's perceptions of the confederate, herself,
the confederate's behavior, her own behavior, and her re-
actions to the task she had engaged in. All the questions
in the postquestionnaire were based on a 7-point scale.
Some of the questions were hypothesized to measure the same
thine. Thus, on the basis of their face validity and the
inter-i tern correl at ions
,
questions were summed together to
form eight sets with each group being treated as a single
dependent variable. An alpha coefficient was obtained for
each group of questions (Guilford, 1954) • The following is
a brief description of what the questions in each group
measured , the questions included in the group , and the alpha
coefficient (all the questions are given in Appendix 3)
:
1. Other resronsibl
e
. To what extent the sub-
jects perceived that the other person's behavior
was responsible for the subject % s behavior.
(Questions 1(a), Kb), 2(a), 2(g) and 13(a).
.72).
2. Pressured bv other. To what extent the sub-
ject felt pressured by the confederate. (Ques-
tions 2(b), 2(f), 3(h) and 12(h). =
.56).
3
* Own mutually-profitable concern
. The extent
to which the subject perceived herself as being
concerned with obtaining mutually-profitable de-
cisions. (Questions 11(c), 11(e), 11(h), ll(i),
ll(m), 12(b), 12(d), 12(e), 12(f) and 12(g).
.92).
4. Other's mutually-profitable concern
. The ex-
tent to which the subject perceived the confeder-
ate as being concerned with obtaining mutually-
profitable decisions. (Questions 2(c), 2(e),
2(h), 2(1), 2(rn), 3(b), 3(e), 3(f) and 3(g).
d = .82).
5. S elf rational vs. irrational . To what extent
the subject perceived her own behavior as ration il
vs. irrational. (Questions 11(d), 11 ( j ) , and
12(i). oi = .60).
6. Other rational vs. irrational . To what extent
the subject perceived the confederate's behavior
as rational vs. irrational. (Questions 2(d),
2( j ) and 3(i). oC = .67).
7. Liking for other . To what extent the sub-
ject liked the confederate. (Questions 2(n),
7, 8 and 10. 0( = .58).
8. Satisfaction. The subject's satisfaction
with the outcome and her own behavior. (Ques-
tions 5, 6 and 11(1). o( = .50).
The items that were not in any one of the above mentioned
groups were analyzed individually.
RESULTS
Analysis of Results
Analyses were performed such that the error term for
each dependent measure would be based on all available da
as suggested by Hornbeck (1973) and Himmelfarb (1973).
Therefore, for each dependent measure a one-way analysis
of variance on all five conditions (four experimental con
ditions plus the control condition) was first performed.
Then a 2 X 2 analysis of variance was performed on the
four experimental conditions using the error term from th
one-way analysis of variance. If the results for the one
way analysis of variance were significant for any one of
the dependent measures, a Dunnett's test was performed to
test for significant differences between the control grou.
and each of the experimental groups.
Effects due to experimenters or confederates were als.
analyzed. Since analyzing for both experimenter effects
and confederate effects in one analysis would make the nu:
ber of subjects per cell too small, effects for experimen
ters were analyzed in a 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance an
effects for confederates were analyzed separately in a
4X2X2 analysis of variance. Again, the error terms
used were based on all the data.
Preouest ionnai re
Following the instructions but prior to the communica-
tion from the confederate, subjects and confederates were
asked to complete a preques tionnaire. The object of the
prequestionnaire was to obtain the subject's perception of
the task she was about to engage in. No differences were
expected between experimental conditions since the pre-
questionnaire was completed prior to any experimental mani-
pulations.; However, when a 2 X 2 analysis of variance '-'as
performed there was a significant main effect for content
of communication on the bipolar adjective irrational-ra-
tional (F( 1 ,55) = 5.7, p^l.025 ). Subjects in the appeal
conditions expected a typical other to behave more ration-
ally (X = 5.96) than subjects in the neutral conditions
(X - 5.04). Also, there were tv/o significant interactions
between Content of Communication and Mode of Communication
on the bipolar adjectives, passive-active (F(l,55) = 7.02,
pz^.025) and weak-strong (F(l,55) = 12. 57, p^.001).
Listed in order of extremity from the midpoint, on the aver-
age, subjects expected the typical other to behave ration-
ally (X = 5.50), friendly (X = 5.32), actively (X = 5.23),
competitively (X - 5.23), strongly (X = 5.20), wisely (X =
4.90), honestly (X = 4.65), t r us twor thi ly (x = 4.65),
23
successfully (X = 4.65), changeably (X = 4.63), morally
(X = 4.60), and coersively (X = 4.53). 3
Number of Cooperative Moves
Subjects participated in 20 trials of a PDG. Choice
A was considered a cooperative response while choice 3 was
considered an exploitative response. The main dependent
measure was the number of cooperative responses during the
20 trials.
A 2 X 2 analysis of variance revealed that there was a
significant main effect for content of communication
(F(l,55) = 6. 35, p Z.025) . As predicted, subjects cooper-
ated more toi lowing a cooperative appeal than following a
neutral statement (Table 1). In addition, there was a
significant interaction between Content and Mode of Com-
munication (F(l,55) = 4.63, pZl.05). A simple effects test
showed that the difference between the appeal and neutral
conditions was only significant when the communication
was spoken (F(l,55) = 10.92, pZ.005).
Insert Table 1 about here
It was further predicted that subjects would cooperate
more in both the spoken and wri t ten-appeal conditions than
in the control condition. A Dunnett's test was performed
to determine whether any of the experimental groups dif-
fered significantly from the control group. The spoken-
Table 1
Mean number of cooperative choices as a
function of content and mode of communication3
Content of Communication
Neutral Cooperative
Statement Appeal
Written 15.2 15.8 15.5
Mode of
Communication
Spoken 10.8 18.3 14.5
13.0 17.0
Control
12.0
a There were 12 subjects in each cell.
appeal group was the only one that differed significantly
from the control group (d(5,55) = 2.78, pZ.,05) in the pre-
dicted direction.
Within the appeal conditions the spoken-appeal was ex-
pected to elicit greater cooperation than the wri tten-
appeal * Although the difference between the two appeal
conditions was in the predicted direction, it was not sig-
nificant (F(l,55) = 1.31).
Within the neutral conditions a simple effects test
revealed that there was a marginally significant difference
such that subjects in the spoken-neutral condition cooper-
ated less than subjects in the wri tten-neutral condition
(F(l,55 ) = 3. 73, .05^p/-.10).
Analyses were performed to test for any effects on the
number of cooperative moves due to the four confederates
and/or the two experimenters. There were no significant
effects due to confederates on this dependent measure. How-
ever, there was a significant interaction between Content
of Communication and Experimenter (F(l,50) = 4. 24, p .05 ) •
Although both experimenters obtained more cooperation in
the appeal conditions than in the neutral conditions,
simple effects tests revealed that this difference was
only significant for experimenter 1 (F(l,50) = 8.22, p^.,01).
Since subjects in the appeal conditions indicated on
the prequestionnaire that they expected the typical other
to behave more rationally than subjects in the neutral
conditions, the main effect for content obtained on the
number of cooperative moves could have been simply due to a
sampling error. To test whether there was any support for
this argument an additional analysis was performed. A
median split was performed on subjects in the appeal con-
ditions on the basis of their rational-irrational scores on
the precuestionnaire. The results of a t-test indicate
that there was no significant difference between the two
groups created by the median split on the number of coopera-
tive moves (t(22) = .40, n.s.). Thus, the explanation that
the significant main effect of content on the number of
cooperative moves was due to sampling error was not sup-
ported .
Postquestionnaire
----„-*
,
The results from the postquestionnaire are summarized
in Table 2. It was predicted that subjects in the appeal
conditions would think that they were better able to deter-
mine the confederate's intentions, that these intentions
were more benevolent, and that the confederate was less
confused than would sub j ec ts in ei ther the neutral or con-
trol conditions . Within the appeal conditions it was pre-
dicted that the confederate 1 s intentions would be cl earer
to the subject in the spoken -appeal condition than in the
wri t ten- appeal condition.
Insert Table 2 about here
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On the question of how well the subject thought she
could determine the confederate's intentions, there was a
main effect for content of communication as predicted.
Subjects in the appeal conditions perceived that they could
determine the confederate's intentions better than subjects
in the neutral conditions. Both the spoken-appeal (d(5,55) =
2.50, pZ.05) and the written-appeal (d(5,55) = 2.62, pzi.05)
conditions also differed significantly from the control con-
dition. As predicted, subjects in both of the appeal con-
ditions perceived that they could determine the confeder-
ates' intentions better than subjects in the control con-
dition. There were no significant differences between the
spoken-appeal group and the written-appeal group.
As predicted, on the measure of "other's mutually-pro-
fitable concern" there was a significant main effect for
con:ent of communication such that subjects in the coopera-
tive-appeal condition saw the confederate as being more
concerned with reaching mutually-profitable decisions than
subjects in the neutral conditions. Although a Dunnett's
test revealed that within the appeal conditions neither the
spoken nor the written condition differed significantly
from the control condition, when the two appeal conditions
were combined and a preplanned comparison was carried out,
there was a marginally significant difference in the pre-
dicted direction between the appeal conditions and the
control condition (F(l,55) = 3.49, .05^p£.10).
Summarizing, it appears that subjects in the appeal condi-
tions did, in fact, perceive the confederate as being more
concerned with mutually profitable decisions than subjects
in the neutral or control conditions.
On the item measuring to what extent the subject per-
ceived the confederate's behavior as confused there was a
main effect for content of communication, as predicted.
A planned comparison test between the control and the two
appeal conditions revealed a marginally significant effect
(F(l,55) = 3.96, ,05^p^r.l0) in the predicted direction.
Thus, subjects in the appeal condition perceived the con-
federate's behavior as less confused than subjects in the
neutral or control conditions. There was no significant
difference between the spoken-appeal and wri tten-appeal
conditions.
There was a marginally significant main effect for con-
tent of communication on the measure of the subjects' per-
ceptions of the other person as being rational vs. irra-
tional. Subjects perceived the confederate as being more
rational in the appeal conditions as compared to the neu-
tral condition. However, there was a significant Confe-
derate X Content of Communication interaction (F( 3 ,40 ) =
2.87, pZ1.05). Simple effects tests revealed that only for
two of the four confederates (F(l ,40) = 14.98, p^.,001;
F(l ,40) = 36.71, pZ.,001) was there a significant differ-
ence on the above measure between the appeal and neutral
condi t ions
.
It was expected that the neutral statement (in compari-
son to the control group) might either be perceived as an
inappropriate attempt to coerce the subject or it might in-
crease liking of the confederate. if this latter effect
occurred, it was expected to be greater in the spoken than
written-neutral condition due to the availability of non-
verbal cues to express feelings. On the measure of "pres-
sured by other" a main effect was obtained for content of
communication. Subjects in the cooperative appeal condi-
tion felt more pressured than subjects in the neutral con-
ditions. Furthermore, there were no differences between
the control condition and any one of the experimental con-
ditions on the above measure. No significant effects were
obtained for either the measure of "liking for other" or
for the measure cf "satisfaction". Similarly, no signifi-
cant effects were obtained on any of the items included in
the two measures when the items were analyzed individually.
This lack of significant difference between the neutral and
control conditions is expected since no differences in co-
operation were found between the neutral and control con-
ditions.
There were several questions on the pos tquest i onnai re
dealing with the subject's perception of her own behavior.
No predictions were made on these items.
On the measure "other responsible" there was a signi-
ficant main effect for content of communication. Subjects
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in the cooperative appeal condition perceived that the con-
federate was more responsible for their behavior than sub-
jects in the neutral condition. Both the spoken-appeal
condition (d(5,55) = 2.84, pZ.,05) and the wri t ten-appeal
condition (d(5,55) = 2.97, p^l.05) differed significantly
from the control condition. Subjects in the appeal condi-
tions perceived that the confederate was more responsible
for their behavior than subjects in the control condition.
On the measure of "own mutually-profitable concern"
there was a marginal main effect for content of communica-
tion. Subjects in the neutral conditions perceived them-
selves as being less concerned than subjects in the appeal
conditions with obtaining mutually-profitable decisions.
The spoken-appeal condition was marginally different from
the control condition (d( 5,55 ) = 1 . 75, .05^p<d.l0). Sub-
jects in the spoken-appeal condition correctly perceived
themselves as being more concerned with mutual profits
than subjects in the control condition.
It was also predicted that subjects would not feel
anonymous in the experiment and no differences were expected
across conditions. The subject was asked on the postques-
tionnaire how likely it was that the confederate would re-
cognize her the next day if she saw her on campus. The re-
sponse was based on a 1-7 scale ranging from very likely to
very unlikely. No significant effects were obtained on this
dependent measure or any of the independent variables with
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the mean response being 3.53. However, there was a main
effect for confederate (F(3,40) = 5.03, p^.005) but it did
not interact with any of the independent variables.
DISCUSSION
The present study intended to induce reciprocal cooper-
ation by manipulating clarity of intentions to be uncondi-
tionally cooperative. It was hypothesized that a subject
v/ould engage in reciprocal cooperation to the extent that
the intentions of the unconditional cooperator were clear
to her and she did not attribute the unconditional coopera-
tor 's behavior to confusion. Thus, it was predicted that
when the unconditional cooperator presented her intentions
in a written cooperative appeal or a spoken cooperative ao-
peal prior to the start of the PDG, subjects would engage
in more cooperation than following a neutral statement or
no communication from the unconditional cooperator. It
v/as also hypothesized that the availability of nonverbal
cues in the spoken-appeal would further increase the
clarity of intentions in comparison to the wri t ten-appeal
and, in turn, increase reciorocal cooperation.
The results of the present study supported some of the
above predictions on amount of reciprocal cooperation.
Subjects cooperated more in the appeal conditions than the
neutral conditions. However, only subjects in the spoken-
appeal condition engaged in more cooperation than subjects
in the control condition. Although the spoken-appeal did
not elicit significantly more reciprocal cooperation than
the written-appeal, it is likely that this difference was
attenuated by a ceiling effect within the spoken-appeal con-
dition which had a mean level of 18.3 cooperative responses
on 20 trials. There was a marginally significant differ-
ence in cooperation between the wri t ten-neutral and spoken-
neutral conditions. Subjects cooperated less in the spoken-
neutral as compared to the wri t ten-neutral condition. This
may have been due to the confederate'
s
perception of the
situation in the spoken-neutral condition which may have in-
fluenced her behavior and, in turn, affected the subject's
perception of the confederate. Confederates in the spoken-
neutral condition felt awkward delivering the statement
and often expressed this awkwardness to the experimenter
following the experiment. However, they did not feel this
awkwardness in any of the other conditions. Therefore, it
is very likely that the confederate may have communicated
this awkwardness to the subject through nonverbal cues in
the spoken-neutral condition. Examining the means of the
relevant individual items in the pos tquestionnai re for the
neutral conditions indicates how the subjects perceived the
confederate in the spoken-neutral condition relative to the
wri tten-neutral condition, although these differences were
not statistically significant. The subjects perceived the
confederate as more confused <3?
spoken = 2.42, Xwritten =
2.00), as caring less about what happened ( x S pokc, n
= 4*58,
34
X
written = 5.50), as less rational (X r . = 1.83, Xspoken - ' Awritten
2.42), and as making her intentions less clear (X a
spoken
X
written = 5 - 17 ) in the spoken-neutral than the written-neu-
tral condition.
Various studies with mixed-motive games found that co-
operation in such situations is reciprocated more often when
it is perceived as intentionally cooperative (Deutsch, 1953)
Nemeth (1970) suggests that the failure to obtain much re-
ciprocity in studies of unconditional cooperation by one
person is due to the unconditional cooperator's intentions
being unclear. When his intentions are not communicated,
the unconditionally cooperative person's behavior may be
interpreted as reflecting confusion, disinterest, and even
deception rather than intentional cooperation.
Thus, it was hypothesized that an increase in clarity of
intentions would mediate an increase in reciprocal coopera-
tion. As measured by the postquestionnaire
,
subjects in
the appeal conditions reported that they were better able
to determine the unconditional cooperator's intentions,
that the unconditional cooperator was less confused, and
that the unconditional cooperator was more concerned with
mutual profits than in the neutral or control condition.
However, there was no significant difference on the above
measures between the spoken and written appeal conditions.
Thus, it appears that the nonverbal cues available in the
SDoken-aopeal condition did not increase clarity of
intentions as compared to the written appeal. Although
the spoken-appeal condition was the only one significantly
different from the control on number of cooperative moves
it docs not appear to be due to an increase in clarity of
intentions communicated through nonverbal cues.
One explanation could be that the nonverbal cues in the
spoken-appeal may have made the confederate's intentions
more believable. If this were the case, subjects would hav
cooperated more in the initial trials after the spoken-ap-
peal than after the wri t ten-appeal
. However, in later tria
once subjects in the wri t ten-appeal realized that the con-
federate was behaving according to her stated intentions,
the difference in reciprocal cooperation as well as clarity
of intentions between the spoken and wri tten-appeal condi-
tions may have been reduced or eliminated. To test whether
there was any support for this explanation, blocks of trial
were included in the analysis. The number of cooperative
moves over the 20 trials were divided into A blocks and
into 2 blocks. The only significant effect was the inter-
action of 2 Trial Blocks X Mode of Communication X Content
of Communication (f (1 ,55 ) = 4.51, p «^.05 ) • However, the
means were not in the direction predicted by this explana-
tion. Therefore, no support was found for the argument
that the spoken-appeal increased the bel ievabi 1 i ty of the
unconditional cooperator's intentions.
There are alternative explanations for the increase in
cooperation in the spoken-appeal condition. it might be
that the unconditional cooperator's verbalization of her
intentions in the experimenter's presence, rather than her
nonverbal cues £er se, was responsible for the increase in
cooperation
.
The fact that the confederate verbalized her intention
in the presence of the experimenter and the subject in the
spoken-appeal condition may have resulted in the subject
perceiving the confederate as being more "publicly" commit
to her intentions than in the writ ten-appeal condition. I
this were the case, subjects would have been more likely
to believe that the confederate would, in fact, behave ac-
cording to her stated intentions and the confederate would
have been perceived as more concerned with mutual profits
in the spoken-appeal as compared to the written-appeal con
dition. Thus, this may have accounted for the increase in
reciprocal cooperation in the spoken-appeal condition. Ho
ever, as stated above, the results from the blocks of tria
analysis did not support the explanation that the increase
in reciprocal cooperation in the spoken-appeal condition
was due to greater bel ievabi li ty of the confederate' s in-
tentions by the subject. The subjects also did not per-
ceive the confederate as more concerned with mutual profit
in the spoken-appeal vs. the wri tten-appeal condition as
measured in the postquestionnaire. Thus, there is no supp
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for the explanation that the increase in reciprocal coopera-
tion in the spoken-appeal condition was due to the subject's
perceiving the confederate as more "publicly" committed to
her intentions in the spoken vs. the wri tten-appeal condi-
tion.
However, the increase in reciprocal cooperation in the
spoken-appeal condition may have been due to the fact that
the subject felt more accountable for her behavior since
the experimenter heard the confederate explicitly state her
intentions only in the spoken-appeal condition. In the
spoken-appeal condition it was apparent to the subjects
that the experimenter was aware of the unconditional coopera-
tor's intentions. In the wri tten-appeal condition the un-
conditional cooperator's written communication was passed
on to the subject by the experimenter. However, it was not
made salient to the subject that the experimenter read the
content of the communication. Thus, the subject may have
assumed that the experimenter was unaware of the uncondition-
al cooperator's intentions. Thus, in the spoken-appeal con-
dition, subjects may have felt more accountable for their
behavior than subjects in the wri tten-appeal condition,
given that the unconditional cooperator's intentions to be
fair and to cooperate were made "public" in the spoken-
appeal condition.
There is some evidence from previous studies showing
that reciprocal cooperation increases when subjects perceive
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that they may have to account for their behavior at some
later point. For example, in Meeker and Shure's (1968)
study subjects were more cooperative toward a "pacifist" if
they were told that their behavior was being monitored by
an observer who would interview them afterwards. Marlowe,
Gergen and Doob (1966) found that the threat of removal cf
a subject's anonymity increased reciprocity of unconditional
cooperation. Increasing the level of friendship between
participants appears to have similar, though more com-
plex, effects (Vinacki, 1969, p. 304).
Since in the spoken-appeal the unconditional cooperator
verbalized her concern with being fair, subjects may have
inferred that the experimenter might evaluate them on the
basis of norms of reciprocity and mutual concern. Thus, they
may have become more concerned with mutual profits and reci-
procated with more cooperation than subjects in the other
conditions. There is some support for this explanation in
the postquestionnaire data. Only subjects in the spoken-
appeal condition perceived themselves as being more con-
cerned (,05^-p^.lO) with mutual profits than subjects ir.
the control condition.
This explanation dees not rule out the notion that
clarity of intentions is necessary for increasing recipro-
cal cooperation. In order for the subject to feel that ex-
ploitation might be evaluated negatively, she must first
perceive that the unconditionally cooperative behavior of
the other person stems from benevolent intentions and not
confusion. On the other hand, it appears that clarity of
intentions is not a sufficient condition to raise the level
of reciprocal cooperation above that obtained in the con-
trol group. Although the unconditional cooperator's inten-
tions in the wri t ten-appeal condition were as clear as in
the spoken appeal, there was no significant difference in
reciprocal cooperation between the wri tten-appeal and con-
trol conditions.
Also, another laboratory study in which an unconditional
cooperator's (pacifist) commitment to principles of non-
violence was communicated to the subject found that this
was not sufficient to elicit an increase in reciprocity of
cooperation. Shure et al (1965) found that although those
subjects who were given information about the pacifist's
principles of nonviolence (the pacifist was described as a
Quaker) perceived the pacifist as significantly more moral,
wiser, more peaceful, and more honest than subject who did
not receive information about the pacifist, there was no
difference between the two groups of subjects in terms of
amount of dominating behavior by the subjects over the paci-
fist. However , in the above study each subject was allegedly
a member of a team and his teammates urged him to dominate
the pacifist. Since the teammates shared in the profits, the
subject may have felt accountable to them for his behavior.
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Although initially it was hypothesized that the nonver-
bal cues in the appeal condition would increase the clarity
of intentions of the unconditional cooperator, the results
on the postquestionnaire data indicate that this did not
occur. This might be a function of the inappropriateness
of the PDG situation for testing that hypothesis. The
subjects' certainty regarding the confederate's intentions
did not diminish in either of the appeal conditions even
though feedback about the confederate's behavior was not
provided to subjects on all of the trials. Since the means
in the appeal conditions on the measures of "clarity of
other's intentions" and "other's behavior confused" were
extreme (see Table 2), it appears that there was little room
for further clarification of intentions. Perhaps the PDG
is an inappropriate context in which to test the hypothesis
that nonverbal cues clarify one's behavioral intentions.
In the PDG, unlike in most situations outside the laboratory,
one's intentions can be stated very clearly and specifically.
Further, since there are only two behavioral alternatives
for each person on each trial, once the intentions are
stated there is little ambiguity as to what the resultant
behavior will be. In order to study the role of nonverbal
cues in clarifying intentions, a situation with more beha-
vioral alternatives might be more appropriate.
SUMMARY
This study looked at the influence of communication on
reactions to "unconditionally cooperative" behavior in a
PDG. Sixty female subjects participated individually in
20 trials of a PDG with an "unconditionally cooperative"
partner (confederate). A 2 X 2 factorial design was em-
ployed varying the content of the communication (appeal vs.
neutral statement) and mode of communication (spoken vs.
v/ritten) from the confederate. Prior to the beqinninq of
the game the confederate either communicated to the subject
her intentions to cooperate, emphasizing the fairness of co
operation and asking the subject to reciprocate the cooper-
ation (appeal conditions), or made a statement of comparabl
length regarding the new psychology building in which they
were located (neutral conditions). The confederate either
communicated verbal 1 y face-to-face wi th the sub j ect ( spoken
conditions ) or by a written note (written condi tions ) • Al so
there was a control condition in which no communication was
permitted between the confederate and the subject.
It was hypothesi zed that reci procal cooperation would
increase as a function of the clarity of intentions of the
confederate. The subject was expected to be more coopera-
tive in the appeal conditions than in either the neutral
i
or control conditions. Also, the nonverbal cues present
in the spoken-appeal condition were expected to increase
clarity of the confederate's message and in turn elicit
greater reciprocal cooperation than in the wri t ten-appeal
condi tion
.
On a measure of number of cooperative moves there was
a significant main effect for content of communication, in-
dicating that subjects cooperated more following an appeal
than a neutral statement. Also, there was a significant-
Content X Mode of Communication interaction. A simple ef-
fects test showed that the difference between the appeal
and neutral conditions was only significant when the com-
munication was spoken. Only the spoken-appeal condition
differed significantly from the control condition with
greater reciprocal coooeration in the snok en-anne^] condi-
tion than in the control condition.
Postquestionnaire data indicated that nonverbal cues
did not increase the clarity of the confederate's intention
The results were explained as probably being due to the
subject 1 s feeling more accountable for their behavior fol-
lowing the confederate's "public" statement of her inten-
tions in the spoken-appeal condition.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Two female experimenters were used in the present study.
2. Four female confederates were used in the present study.
3. For some of the items, the scale had to be reversed so
that for all items the greater the score, the more of the
particular characteristic referred to.
»
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APPENDIX A
Written Instructions for Experiment
This experiment is concerned with decision-making beha-
,
V
*°S
in
^
St™Ctured situation. We want to look at whatkinds of decisions are made when each of you has to make
choices which affect the amount of money paid to you as'
well as the other person. Both of you will be making a
series of these choices at the same time, without knowinchow the other, at the moment, is choosing. Each pair of"
choices will be called a trial.
Look at the figure on your panel. This shows all thepossible outcomes for a given trial. There are four possiblepayments for each person. The payments for each of you aredetermined by the combined choices of both of vou. if you
choose A, you will get five cents or no cents depending on
what the other person does; if you choose B, you' will get
nine cents or one cent depending on what the other person
does. If both of you choose A, you will each receive five
^uu j. x u^ui ui ywu v-j .^O^tr o
,
yuu Wll ± t'dCd get OMe Cent
.
If one chooses A while the other chooses 3, the one who
chose 3 will get nine cents and the one who chose A will
get no cents.
A trial will begin when the signal light in the lower
left hand corner is on. When you have made your decision for
a given trial, move your switch to the left if your choice
is A and move your switch to the right if your choice is B.
When the signal light goes off return your switch to the
off posi tion
.
One of the 4 lights in the center of the panel will come
on to indicate to you how much you have earned and how much
the other person has earned* You are to record that on the
sheet of paper you were given and add that to your total
earnings. This will conclude a trial. The next trial be-
gins when the signal light comes on again. You will parti-
cipate in 20 trials.
The purpose is to earn as much money for yoursel f as
you can. To f ami 1 i arize you with all the possible out-
comes of a trial we wi 11 do seme oractice trial s now.
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Oral Instructions for Practice Trials
(Any words in parenthesis were not read to the subjectThese words were cues to the experimenter)
To familiarize you with all of the possible outcomes of
a trial, we will do some practice trials now. Instead ofyou choosing what choice to pick on a given trial, duringthese practice trials, I will tell each of you what letter
to pick. This procedure will help to familiarize yourself
with all of the outcomes.
When the signal light in the lower left hand corner ofyour panel goes on this signifies the beginning of a trial.
For this trial you (confederate) will move your switch to
the left "A" and you (subject) will also move your switch
to the left. When the signal light goes off, return your
switch to the off position. At this point, one of the four
lights making a square on your panel will go on. in this
particular case your choices will result in both of you
earning 5c. This outcome is signified by the amber light.
When you see the results of a trial please indicate on'
the sheet provided for you the amount of money' you made on
that particular trial. Please continue to do this for the
other trials in which the outcomes are provided to you.
This procedure allows you to see how much money you have
made throughout the trials.
When the amber light, or any of the other ?. outcome
lights goes off, a trial has ended. When the signal light
reappears a new trial will begin.
Okay, I will now indicate the start of a new trial with
the signal lights. Nov; you (confederate) switch your switch
to the right "B". and you (subject) switch your switch to
the left "A". Remember when the signal light goes out (put
the signal light out) return your switch to the off posi-
tion. The green light for you (confederate) indicates that
you have made 9c The red light for you (subiect) indicates
that you have made no cents. Remember, when the outcome
light goes off a trial has ended.
Okay, this is the beginning of a new trial. Again,
notice the signal light. Please (confederate) switch your
switch to the left "A" and you (subject) switch your switch
to the right "B". Notice that the signal light is out, so
return your switch to the off position. The red light for
you (confederate) this time indicates that you have made
0<t on the last trial, while the green light (subject) indi-
cates that you have made 9c. Again, when the outcome light
goes off a trial has been completed.
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Now that the signal light is on again, please (confe-derate) switch your switch to the right "B", wh le you ( sub-ject switch your switch to the right also.' The wh iight
IZ ^iG??f^ate) in? icates th«t you have made le ihile
have made ^ (SUbjGCt) ind -ates that you also"
This concludes the practice trials. Naturally, the sameprocedure, minus my verbal instructions, will be used "forthe actual trials.
Do you have any questions?
Each trial will be done just like the practice trials.However, I will not tell you which choice to make. Also
I will not tell you the results after every trial. So
on some of the trials you will have to guess how much moneyyou earned. On other trials one of the four lights on yourpanel will come on to show you the results.
Record your earnings on your sheet for each trial, as
well as your total earnings to that point, by using either
the results I give you or what you think you earned.
This is your dollar for coming. You will receive that
plus any additional money you earn during the experiment.
Calculate the additional earnings on your earnings sheet.
After all the trials are finished, I will total up your
exact earnings and then each of you will be paid separately
.
Your purpose is to earn as much money for yourself as
you can.
There are a couple of ways that people have been using
to do this. One way that a number of people have used suc-
cessfully is to choose B while the other person is choosing
A. By doing this they were able to earn 9c each trial.
This way worked well simply because the results are not
announced after every many trials, and the other person
could not tell that 3 was being chosen that often.
Another way people have used has been to choose A and
hope the other person does also. Sometimes this has worked
out all right, and the person has earned 5c on most of the
trials. But lots of times it hasn't. The reason again is
simply because the results are not announced all the time;
and .while one person was choosing A, the other person chose
B. So instead of earning 5c, the person who chose A ended
up wi th nothing
.
r>r-Obviously, it is important to estimate the other pe
son's intention to choose A or 3 before making your choice.
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It may be difficult to guess the other person's intentionsbut it is important to try to throughout the trials!
'
You might be given an opportunity to communicate aboutyour intentions, and this may help to reduce your uncer-tainty aoout what the other person's going to choose.
But in the past we've found that peoole sometimes saythey are planning to choose A, and then go ahead and chooseB anyhow. So even if you are allowed to communicate it's
really important to be sure about what the other personis up to before you decide to choose either A or B.
(Give out prequestionnaire
)
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Oral Instructions Prior to Communication
There are three types of situations that we are look-ing at in this experiment: in the first situation we donot allow the two people to communicate with each other aboutanything; m the second situation we allow oeool e to com-municate with each other about anything except' about the
experiment. In other words, in this situation the two peoplemay not communicate about the experiment, and in the third
situation we allow people to communicate about anythinq in-
cluding the experiment.
I will determine what situation you two are going to bein randomly, by picking a number from this envelope.
I should remind you that people use these opportunities
to communicate for various purposes. You ought to keep in
mind that the message which you get may say one thing about
what the other person is planning to do, and the person
may, in fact, be planning to do something else. Of course,
people have also sent messages which were accurate descrip-
tions of what they were planning to do. You simply have to
decide for yourself what the other person is communicating.
Okay, now I'm going to pick out a number to determine
which situation you two will be in (pick a number out of
paper bag and pretend to read it).
Control Condition
You are in the situation where you are not to communi-
cate with each other at all. Since it is important that
the two of you do not communicate by talking, sighing or
laughing or in any other way, I will draw this curtain for
the remainder of the experiment.
Neutral Condition
You are in the situation where you may communicate about
anything except about the experiment. I'd like to ask you,
please, not to communicate about the experiment. You can,
of course, communicate about anything else you'd like, but
until this experiment is over I must ask you not to com-
municate about anything relating to this experiment.
Appeal Condition
You are in the situation where you may communicate about
anything including the experiment.
5 3
Written Communication
f
If there is anything you want to say, please write itdown on the piece of paper that I will now give to you andhand it to me to give to the other person. if you don'twant to say anything, simply write that you don't want tocommunicate anything, and give me the sheet. I will ex-change the sheets once both of you have written somethingdown. if you're going to write anything down, make it astatement for I am only going to exchange the sheets onc e.
(After exchange) Since it is important that you do notcommunicate by sighing, laughing, or in any other way, I
will draw the curtain for the remainder of " the trials.
Spoken Communication
If you want to say something to the other person, please
make it a statement since each of you will get only one
chance to talk.
Would you like to say something? (look at confederate
first.
)
( After messages are sooken ) Since it is important
that you do not communicate by sighing, laughing, or in
any other way, I will draw the curtain for the remainder
of the trials.
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APPENDIX B
Pre-Questionnaire
.
Describe how you would expect the typica l person (otherthan yourself) to behave in the situation I have iust
'
described to you?
a
.
Passive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Active
b. Noncoersive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Coersi ve
c. Di shonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest
d. Irrational 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Rational
e. Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competi ti ve
f Manipulative 1 3 4 5 6 7 Nonmanipulati ve
g. Weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong
h. Moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Immoral
i Suspicious 1 2 3 4 b 6 7 Trusting
j. Wise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fool ish
k. Stable 1 2 3 4 c; 6 7 Changeabl
e
1. Successful 1 2 3 4 5 6 "7 Unsuccessful
m. Un trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Trustworthy
n. Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfriendly
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Post-Questionniare
1
.
Using a number from the scale below, please indicate by
number the extent to which you estimate each of th*following factors was responsible for your behavior.
not at all
responsibl
e
3 4 7
a
.
b.
very
responsible
Other Person's behavior : what the other
said or did during the trials or what
vented or allowed you to do.
person
she pre-
Communication opportuni ties : The extent to
which the experimental conditions facilitated
communication.
ion or behavior
c « The experimenter's expectations and behavio r:
what the experimenter's instruc"
prevented or allowed you to do.
2. Describe how the other person behaved:
a. Passive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Active
b. Noncoers i ve 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Coersi ve
c. Di shones
t
1 2 4 5 6 7 Honest
d. Irrat ional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Rational
e. Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competit ive
f
.
Manipulative 1 2 3 cl 5 6 7 Nonmanipulat ive
g. Weak 1 2 0^> 4 5 6 7 Strong
h. Moral 1 2 5 4 5 6 7 Immoral
•
1 Suspicious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Trust i ng
J. Wise 1 2 3 A 5 6 7 Fool i sh
k. Stable 1 2 Acl 5 6 7 Changeable
1. Successful 1 2 3 A 5 5 •7/ Unsuccessful
m. U n t ru s twor thy 1 2 *"\ 4 5 6 7 Trus twor thy
n. Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unf ri endl
y
3. Using the seal
•the f ol lowing
e below
factors
how much d
influenced
o vou think each
the other person
of
f s
behavi or? ( Pu t a number i ri f ron t of each factor. s
no influence
at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
crucial
influence
moderate
i nf 1 uence
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h*
^^seri about what she was supposed to nb
- 5he was trying to trick me. do.C
"
points!
trYin9
^ QVoid and still make some
she was trying to work toward both of us receivirca fair share which is approximabiTy the sameshe was trying to do better than me.
she was trying to maximize her own score,
she was trying to helo me.
wanted?
trY 'ln9 t0 ^es sure me into doi^ what she
she didn't really care about what happened.
intenUonsr
6 Y°U ^ t0 determine the person's
e.
f.
g.
h.
1 .
4 . a.
determine
unable
very well 12 3 4 5 6 7 determine
5. How satisfied are you with the outcome?
very satisfied 12 3 4 5 6 7 very unsatisfied
6. If you were to participate in this experiment over ac=. : nhow likely is it that you would change your behavior?
very likely 12 3 4 5 6 7 very unlikely
Please specify how.
7. How satisfied were you with the relationship establishedbetween yourself and the other person?
very satisfied 12 3 4 5 6 7 very unsatisfied
8. How much did you like the other person?
did not like liked her
her at all 12 3 4 5 6 7 very much
9. If you were to participate in an experiment similar to
this one in the future, who would you prefer as the
other person?
a. The other person in the present experiment
b. A new person
#
How strong is your preference?
very weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very strong
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10. Using the scale below indicate how likely it is thatyou would become friends with the other person if youspent more time with her. Y
very likely 12 3 4
11. Describe how you behaved.
6 7 very unlikely
a. Passive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Active
b. Noncoersive 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 Coersive
c. Di shones
t
1 2 4 5 6 7 Honest
d. Irrational 1 2 4 5 6 7 Rational
e. Cooperative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competi tive
f
.
Manipulation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nonmanipul ati ve
g. Weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong
h. Moral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Immoral
•
i Suspicious 1 2 4 5 6 7 Trusti ng
• Wise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fool i sh
n J s v> 1 -
.J LC1U1C 1 *5 r r~O <—
j
/ Ci idngedbl e
1. Successful 1 2 4 5 6 7 Unsuccessful
rn. Untrustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Trustworthy
n Friendl
y
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfriendly
12. Using the scale below,
the f ol lowing factors
how much do you think each of
influenced vour own behavior?
not inf luence at
all 1 2 3 7
crucial
inf 1 uence
a
.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f
g-
h.
*
i
I was confused about t
I was trying to trick
I was trying to avoid
some points.
of the expt.he rules
the other person,
trouble and still make
I
a
I
I
I
T
•was trying
fair share
was trying
was trying
was trying
to work t
which is
do bet
owards both o us rece mq
to
to
approximately the same.
_
ter than the other person,
maximize my own score.
to hem
was beina nressured
he other person.
by the other person into
doing what she •an tea
.
I didn't really care about what happened.
13, Using the scale below, to what extent do you think the
foil owing fact or s infl uenced the outcome?
not at all
influents 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Influential
moderate
influence
a
' tne other person's behavior
b « your own behavior
IL.^v 0^ PS fSOn WerS to See on c™P"s tomorrohow likely is it that she would recognize you?
very likely 12 3 4 5 6 7 very unlikely


